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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper critically examines the relationship between corporate governance and related party 
transactions (RPTs). RPTs have become a global hot topic due to the link between undisclosed 
RPTs and the collapse of some high profile companies. This paper analyses the current literature 
and establishes a relationship between corporate governance indicators and the number of RPTs by 
using Bangladesh banking sector data.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of undisclosed related party transactions 
(RPTs)1 can facilitate fraudulent financial reporting 
and misappropriation of assets. The recent failure 
of giant corporations in the USA again confirmed 
this. For example, Enron used special purpose 
entities controlled by its CFO to manipulate 
income and transfer cash, and Adelphia guaranteed 
related party debt and provided extensive loans to 
its executive (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2004) [1]. As 
                                                 
1 “Related party transactions include transactions between (a) a 
parent company and its subsidiaries; (b) subsidiaries of a 
common parent; (c) an enterprise and trusts for the benefit of 
employees, such as pension and profit sharing trusts that are 
managed by or under the trusteeship of the enterprise’s 
management; (d) an enterprise and its principal owners, 
management and the members of their immediate families; 
and (e) affiliates” (FASB 57, 1982). 
a result, Congress passed section 402 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, which banned most loans to 
executives and directors. This act has become 
controversial because RPTs are not always harmful 
for the performance of the company. Sometimes it 
becomes inevitable for the company to enter into 
RPTs to maximize the benefits to the shareholders. 
So an alternative view is that strengthening 
corporate governance2 -rational payment to the 
                                                 
2 "Corporate governance is the system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate 
governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structure through which the company objectives 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance."-UTS centre for corporate 
governance, University of Technology Sydney  
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member of board and the appointment of outsider 
monitors- can help in justifying RPTs (Gordon, 
Henry and Palia 2004) [2]. 
 
II. AIM AND SCOPE 
 
The aim of this study is to discuss the relationship 
between RPTs and corporate governance in 
developing countries. The developing countries 
have been selected as a research area because 
almost all the study conducted so far related to this 
issue has been in the context of the USA and other 
developed countries (Gordon et al 2004b) [2], 
(Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2004) [1]).  
 
The scope of the study is limited to analysis of the 
association of RPTs and governance in banking 
sector of Bangladesh. The banking sector of 
Bangladesh is selected because banks are the 
lender of depositors’ money and failure of banks 
can result in direct monetary loss to depositors. 
Due to privatization, most of the shares of a bank 
are owned by professional businesspeople who 
have other businesses. These people hold the Board 
of Directors’ position due to their major ownership 
and use the banks’ resources for personal benefits. 
But little research has been conducted in 
Bangladesh regarding the need for controlling and 
improvement of disclosures of RPTs. 
 
III. STRUCTURE 
 
The next section of this paper presents an analysis 
of the related laws and pronouncements as well as 
current literature on related party transactions for 
banks. The last section of this paper deals with 
analysis of the findings.  
 
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. History and Context 
 
The history of RPTs can be traced as back as to the 
emergence of corporate type of business after 
industrial revolution. It first came into focus in 
1973 when U.S. Financial Corporation used it to 
create millions of dollars phantom profits and blew 
up its per share earnings and price and consequent 
bankruptcy of the company (PCAOB, 2004) [3].  
 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) 
issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
no. 57. FASB (1982, 1) [4] statement 57 describes 
RPTs as one of the important areas involving high 
fraud risk. American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA, 2001) [5] also describes 
RPTs as a mechanism used by major shareholders 
and management to overstate income and provide 
inaccurate financial results to market participants. 
It is now mandatory for a company to disclose all 
material RPTs including the nature of the 
relationship, a description of the transaction, the 
dollar amount of transaction for each income 
statement period presented, the amount due to and 
due from the related parties at balance sheet date; 
but disclosure is not required when the transactions 
are eliminated in consolidation (FASB 1982, 1) [4]. 
Though Securities and Exchange Commission, 
USA (SEC- USA) relies on Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (i.e., FASB 57) it requires 
disclosure of any RPTs involving a dollar amount 
exceeding $120,000 and in which the related party 
has direct or indirect material interest, naming such 
person and indicating the relationship to the 
company, the nature of such person’s interest in the 
transaction, the amount of such transaction, and 
where applicable, the amount of such person’s 
interest in the transaction (SEC 2004, subsection 
229.400) [6]. Both SEC rules and FASB requires 
disclosure of RPTs but they differ in terms of place 
of disclosure. FASB requires disclosure of RPT in 
financial statements but SEC rules do not specify 
the place of disclosure in the financial statements. 
This disclosure requirement differs from country to 
country but almost all countries through out the 
world used FASB Statement 57 as a basic 
guideline. 
 
B. Current Theory and Debate 
 
The issues of RPTs again became a hot topic after 
the recent high profile corporate fraud in the USA 
involving RPTs and consequent debarred of loans 
to directors and executives by US congress without 
any discussion with professionals. The academic 
community disagreed with the above regulation of 
congress because RPTs is not always detrimental to 
the best interest of the shareholders. There is a 
common belief among market participants that 
RPTs is always against the best interest of the 
common shareholders because it is assumed that 
through RPTs the member of the board uses the 
resources of the company for their personal benefit. 
For example, the CEO of a bank takes loan from 
the organization at a lower interest rate than the 
market. This view of RPTs is consistent with 
‘potential wealth transfer’ of FASB 57, ‘conflict of 
interest hypothesis’ of Gordon et al and ‘agency 
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concern’ considered by Berle and Means (1932) [7] 
and Jensen and Meckling (1976) [8]. The opposing 
viewpoint regarding RPT is that company can enter 
into RPT to maximize the interest of the 
shareholders. It occurs when substance of the 
transaction justify the underlying economic reality. 
For example, a garments manufacturing company 
can invest in textile industry to get fabrics at lower 
price and increase overall profit. Gordon et al. 
(2004) [2] and Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) [1] 
supported this view as efficient contracting. So 
RPT itself is not always harmful for the 
shareholders. The important thing is the type of 
RPTs. So instead of regulation, the member of the 
board should justify that the transaction is based on 
its economic substance. This justification becomes 
weak when the organization is under weak 
corporate governance. 
 
V. METHODOLOTY 
 
Both Gordon et al (2004a) [2] and Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew (2004) [1] conclude that weak corporate 
governance leads to more RPTs and find no 
justifications for the latest amendment of SEC Act 
by the congress. The different aspects of corporate 
governance environment includes cash 
compensation paid to the CEO and directors, 
percentage of shareholdings by CEO and directors, 
board size, duality of CEO / chair, percentage of 
shareholdings by institutional owners, percentage 
of independent directors in the board, number of 
board meeting, qualification of audit committee, 
percentage of independent members on the audit 
committee, number of audit committee meetings 
and control variable includes firm size measured by 
assets, EBIT and market value of equity. To test 
the relationship between weak governance and 
RPTs in developing countries the corporate 
mechanism test model by Gordon et al. is used with 
some modifications due to unavailability of some 
information and data was gathered principally from 
the banks’ annual reports that are published 
annually. The final model for corporate governance 
test is as follows: 
 
RPTs = αo + β1 CEO cash pay + β2 CEO equity + 
β3 #BOD + β4 Dual + β5 DirFees + β6 DirStock 
+ β7InstOwner + β8DirInd + β9 NBODM + β10 
QAC + β11ACInd + β12 NACM + γ1 Assets + γ2 
EBIT + γ3 MVE + ε 
 
Here, 
 
RPT = Number of related party 
transactions. 
CEO cash pay = Total annual cash 
compensation to CEO. 
CEO equity = Deciles ranking of the 
percentage of the shares 
held by CEO. 
# BOD = Number of member in the 
Board of Directors. 
Dual = An indicator variable equal 
to 1 if chairman is not an 
executive in the bank, and 
0 otherwise. 
DirFees = Annual cash fees provided 
to non-executive directors 
DirStock = Deciles ranking of the 
percentage of shares held 
by directors. 
Inst owners = Deciles ranking of the 
percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors. 
DirInd = Percentage of independent 
directors on the board. 
NBODM = Number of board meeting 
during the year 
 
QAC = Average qualification of 
the audit committee 
members. 
ACInd  = Percentage of the 
independent directors in the 
audit committee. 
NACM = Number of audit committee 
meeting. 
Assets = Year-end total assets. 
EBIT = Earnings before interest 
and taxes. 
MVE = Year-end market value of 
equity. 
 
A detail description of the variable is provided on 
appendix A 
 
CEO cash pay and CEO equity are indicators of 
CEO compensation. Negative coefficient of these 
variables implies that low compensation leads to 
more RPTs. So, RPTs results from efficient 
contracting. # BOD and Dual are indicators of 
weak governance. Positive coefficients of these 
variables would imply association between weak 
governance and RPTs. Dirfees and Dirstock would 
have the same implication as CEO compensation. 
Instowners, DirInd, NBOD, QAC, ACInd and 
NACM are monitoring variable. So, negative 
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coefficients would be expected. Other variables are 
control variables. As all these control variables 
relate to firm size, positive association is expected. 
 
 
VI. CASE STUDY 
 
A. Context of the Case Study 
 
The private banking sector in Bangladesh is an 
emerging sector. This sector is getting increasing 
attention due to its importance. It plays a vital role 
for development and growth of the economy 
through mobilizations of resources. A bank does 
business with the help of public funds, i.e., deposits 
mainly and the failure of banks could result in 
monetary loss to depositors. The interest of 
depositors is even more important than 
shareholders of a general business organization. So 
establishing transparency and accountability in the 
banking institution is a crucial issue. The journey 
of domestic private banks starts in late 1980s with 
the establishment of International finance and 
investment Corporation Bank. Since then the 
number of private domestic banks increases 
rapidly. At present Bangladesh have 32 scheduled 
domestic private banks. 
 
B. Current Practice 
 
All these scheduled banks are regulated by 
Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh Bank is a regulatory body, which 
issues rules and regulations that need to be 
followed by scheduled bank to conduct banking 
business. According to Banking Regulation and 
Policy Department (BRPD) Circular No. 14 (2003) 
[9], related party is defined as a party, which can 
control or significantly influence the bank directly 
or indirectly. This significant influence can results 
from representation on board of directors, 
involvement in the decision-making process, 
material inter-company transactions, inter-change 
of managerial personnel, dependence on technical 
information etc. The spouse, parents, children, and 
dependants of the directors would generally be 
included in the related party. The bank should 
disclose the name of the directors and their 
affiliated organizations, all important contracts 
between the bank, its subsidiary or fellow 
subsidiary and directors’ affiliated organizations, 
share options given to directors and executives; the 
nature, type, amount, changes in the amount, 
lending policy and the element of transactions. 
The Bank Company Act 1991, section 27 
specifically states that no banking company shall 
make any loans or advances on the security of its 
own shares and without security make any loan or 
advance to any of its directors; any member of the 
family of any of its directors; any commercial 
institution or private company in which the 
banking company itself, or of its directors or any 
member of the family of any of its directors is 
involved as director, owner or shareholder; any 
public limited company which is in some way or 
other controlled by the company itself, or any of its 
directors or any member of the family of any of its 
directors, or the shares of which are held by any of 
the said persons to such an extent as to give it 
control of no less than twenty percent of the voting 
rights of the following persons or institutions, or in 
case where those persons or institutions are 
guarantors. In addition to that no banking company 
shall give to any loan or advance without the 
approval of the majority of the director to any of its 
directors or any person, commercial institution or 
company in which any of the directors of the said 
banking company is interested as partner, director 
or guarantor. Moreover, no banking company shall, 
without the previous permission in writing of the 
Bangladesh Bank, give to any person or institution, 
directly or indirectly, any benefit the aggregate 
value of which exceeds 15 percent of the total 
capital of the said banking company; or 25 percent 
of the total capital of the said banking company 
where the security of the said benefits has been 
provided by such financial securities as might be 
easily put on the market for sale. In addition to that 
every banking company shall, before the close of 
the month to which the report relates, submit to the 
Bangladesh Bank a report in the prescribed form 
and manner about all loans and advances granted 
by it to companies, private as well as public, in 
which the banking company or any of its directors 
is interested as director or managing agent or 
guarantor. If no examination of any report 
submitted it appears to the Bangladesh Bank that 
any loans or advances have been granted to the 
detriment of the interests of the depositors of the 
banking company. 
 
The section 28 of the Bank Company Act covers 
restrictions on the respite of loans. It covers that no 
banking company shall, without the previous 
approval of the Bangladesh Bank, grant respite of 
loans taken from it by any of its directors, or his 
family members; a commercial institution or 
company in which any director of the banking 
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company is interested as landowner, co-director, 
managing agent; and any such person in which any 
director of the banking company is interested as 
partner or landowner. 
 
C. Gaps in Current Theory and Actual Practice 
 
Security Exchange Commission Rules of 
Bangladesh contain very few guidelines on 
disclosure of related party disclosure. Due to this, 
banking organizations in collaboration with 
auditors provides inadequate disclosure on RPTs. 
The World Bank (2003) [10] report on the 
observance of standard and codes states that though 
the ownership structure of many companies implies 
the existence of RPTs, disclosure in the financial 
statements is not as much detail as required by 
International Accounting Standard 24. Same results 
were found by Ahmad and Yousuf (2005) [11] in a 
study of corporate governance. According to them, 
inadequate disclosure is one of the most important 
obstacles to ensure good corporate governance. As 
a result, the banking sector is not free from 
financial abuses and crime. For example, currently 
The Oriental Bank Limited is going to bank craft 
after revealing the financial abuse of the ex-
managing director who embezzled TK 595 core 
(The Daily Star, 2007). So the problem lies in the 
weak governance of the bank company, which 
gives the opportunity of illegal RPTs. 
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Appendix B provides the results of association 
between the number of RPTs and corporate 
governance indicators. As shown in the appendix 
B, CEO cash pay, # BOD, DirFees, Instowners, 
NBODM, ACInd, NACM, and MVE are negatively 
and DirStock, DirInd, QAC, firm size measured by 
Assets and EBIT are positively associated with 
number of RPTs. These negative coefficients of 
CEO cash pay, DirFees, Instowners, NBODM, 
ACInd, NACM and positive coefficients of 
DirStock and size of the firms as measured by the 
Assets and EBIT is almost consistent with 
expectation and results of previous studies (Gordon 
et al, 2004) [2]. However, the negative coefficients 
of #BOD, NBODM and MVE and positive 
coefficients of DirInd, and QAC seems to be 
against the previous studies (Gordon et al 2004b) 
[2], (Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2004) [1]). In respect 
of significance level, ACInd is the most significant 
in controlling number of RPTs and Assets and 
DirInd are moderately significant in increasing 
number of RPTs. DirInd should decrease the RPTs 
but the results shows reverse. It seems that the 
reported RPTs are not the appropriate number 
because of window dressing of the financial 
statements by the company in collaboration of 
auditors. So, fraudulent reporting cannot be 
prevented unless the governance mechanisms 
become strong. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
VARIABLE NAME VARIABLE  DEFINITION 
RPT Number of related party transactions reported by individual bank 
CEO cash pay Cash compensation paid to chief executive officers as salary, bonus and 
other annual cash 
CEO Equity Deciles ranking of the percentage of the shares held by CEO to be 
measured by shares held by CEO divided by total outstanding shares 
multiplied by 10. This variable always equals zero because no CEO in 
the banking sector has shareholdings. 
# BOD Number of member in the Board of Directors as shown in annual report  
Dual An indicator variable equal to 1 if chairman is not an executive in the 
bank, and 0 otherwise. This variable always equals 1 due to separation 
of CEO and chair in every bank under study. 
DirFees Annual cash fees provided to nonexecutive directors 
DirStock Deciles ranking of the percentage of shares held by directors measured 
by shares held by the directors divided by total outstanding shares 
multiplied by 10. 
Inst owners Deciles ranking of the percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors measured by shares held by institutional investors divided by 
total outstanding shares multiplied by 10. 
DirInd Percentage of independent directors on the board of directors. 
Independent director is defined as director having less than 5 percent 
shareholding. 
NBODM Number of meeting of board of directors during the year 
QAC Average qualification of the audit committee members. Qualification of 
individual audit committee member is equal to 5 if he or she has a 
professional business degree, it is equal to 4 if the member is a 
postgraduate in business, equal to three if he or she has any other 
postgraduate degree except business, equal to two if he or she has 
bachelor in business and equal to 1 for any other bachelor degree. 
ACInd Percentage of the independent directors in the audit committee 
NACM NACM Number of audit committee meeting 
Assets Fiscal year end total assets as shown on balance sheet 
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes 
MVE Year end market value of equity as calculated by multiplication of year 
end market value of each share and total number of outstanding shares 
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APPENDIX B 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS: 
 
Coefficients a 
Unstandardized 
 Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
1 (Constant) 2.677 2.070   1.293 .252 
  CEOCASH -2.198E-07 .000 -.141 -.617 .564 
  BOD -.087 .051 -.408 -1.696 .151 
  DIRFEES -4.023E-07 .000 -.419 -1.057 .339 
  DIRSTOCK .037 .214 .056 .174 .869 
  INSOWNER -.500 .344 -.323 -1.453 .206 
  DIRIND .025 .009 .597 2.718 .042 
  NBODM -.015 .017 -.146 -.905 .407 
  QAC .824 .645 .547 1.276 .258 
  ACIND -.052 .010 -1.178 -5.166 .004 
  ACMEET -.117 .061 -1.225 -1.920 .113 
  ASSETS 1.110E-10 .000 1.473 2.840 .036 
  NOI 6.825E-10 .000 .266 1.402 .220 
  MVE -1.677E-11 .000 -.141 -.524 .623 
 
a Dependent Variable: RPTS 
 
 
